CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Peasants’ Conditions in the Fourth District of Laguna
The fourth district of Laguna is rural and the residents depend heavily on agriculture. Almost every household has at least one member who is into farming. Rice is still the major crop in the district, although majority of the farmers have started intercropping their rice with vegetables and other crops.
When they are not in their fields, some of the farmers would go fishing, and a few raise livestock or practice slash-and-burn (kaingin) in the uplands. Many of those living in upper Pangil make handicrafts such as creating paper mosaic and wood carving.
The farmers work hard from land preparation to harvesting, but their earnings are not enough to sustain them. They are burdened with various agricultural problems. Most of them do not own their lands, and do not have capital or access to credit for farm inputs. Farmers also have inadequate irrigation and they lack technical assistance from the local government. Many farmers are exploited in the market, e.g. some private corporations would buy their palay for a very low price, they cannot usually dictate the price in the market.
Adding to these problems are two major issues confronting their farming efforts: The Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure and the Sierra Madre Water Corporation Dam Project. Presented here are the research findings addressing these issues.
Case Study 1. The Creation of the Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure
During the late 1970s, the national government, in cooperation with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), started converting and privatizing the use of Laguna de Bay and the areas surrounding it. These projects started damaging the lake ecosystem.
A lot of different factors that caused damage to the Lake were accompanied by the conversions and privatizations of lake usage. Among these were the establishment of various electrical power plants (SUCAT Fuel Fired Power Station, Malaya Thermal Plant I and II, CALIRAYA Hydroelectric Power Plant, Kalayaan Pump Storage Power Plant, Macban Geothermal Power Plant) and pollutants originating from the factories and local industries (PUMALAG, 2007). A large part of the pollution also came from unregulated dumping of sewage from residential areas near and around the lake.
All these resulted in the gradual or complete loss of plants and phytoplankton in the lake and ecological imbalance, hence further decreasing fish productivity of the lake (LLDA, 1995).
PUMALAG cited that in 1983, some private corporations built large fish pens in the lake, covering from 2,500 to 34,000 hectares. Before this, about 33 species of fish thrived in the lake, but this has now decreased to six or seven species only.
The situation at the lake further worsened with the approval by the former President Corazon Aquino of the Dominant Water Use Policy of 1989 justifying the conversion plan to make the lake the primary water supply source for Metro Manila. From the time of its declaration, Pres. Aquino and the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) allowed the use of a P622 M fund for the Rizal Province Water Supply Improvement Project according to PUMALAG.
In the early 1980s, the storm water flow magnitude increased, causing uncontrollable floods in parts of Metropolitan Manila. Because of this, along with the pressing problem of water pollutants and the water supply project of the government, the Manggahan Floodway was constructed. This floodway adjoined Marikina River with the Laguna de Bay – easing and mitigating the floods in Manila, especially along the Pasig River where Malacañang was located. This project established Laguna de Bay as a reservoir of flood waters.
The creation of the floodway paved the way for the construction of the Napindan Hydraulic Control System (NHCS) in 1983. The structure was intended to lessen the increase in salinity due to saltwater entering from Manila Bay and to block pollutants entering from the Pasig River into Laguna de Bay. The NHCS was built adjoining the Marikina and Pateros-Taguig rivers with the Pasig River. This union of two rivers is also the downstream endpoint of the Napindan Channel, which is the upper part of Pasig River that connects to Laguna de Bay (http://www.vistapinas.com, accessed 2009).
The NHCS project would have the following effects (Figure 2):
1. The water in some parts of Metro Manila, especially along the Pasig River, would be diverted to Laguna for temporary storage through the Rosario weir.
2. The Marikina River Control Structure would be closed to prevent the water from the Marikina River from flowing into the Pasig River and the city of Manila; this would also result in flooding in Marikina.
3. The floodwaters in Marikina would flow into the Laguna de Bay and would also overflow into the towns near the lake.
4. The Metro Manila area would then be free from flooding.
5. The residents near the lake, in turn, would suffer as a consequence of the diverted water flow.
Since its establishment, the LLDA would regularly close the NHCS. They would open only one of the six openings to allow the polluted water to flow from the factories in Metro Manila down to the other shorelands of the lake, particularly in the Fourth District of Laguna.
Figure 2. Map of the Manggahan Floodway and the Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure and the results of their construction. (Source: Naghihingalong Lawa: Ang Kalagayan ng Lawa ng Laguna at mga Isyu, PowerPoint presentation prepared by PUMALAG, 2007)
The construction of the NHCS affected the lives of farmers and fisherfolks who mainly or partly depended on the lake for their livelihood. The regular closing of the Napindan channel had generated negative reactions from the people whose primary source of livelihood was affected.
As a supposed response to the needs of the fisherfolks to catch more fish, the LLDA allowed the establishments of new fish cages in 1994. However, some of these cages were owned by big businesses who were not residents of the area. In 1994, there were 62 fish pens owned by fishermen cooperatives, occupying and area of about 2,382 hectares; 187 structures were owned by corporations or about 10,485 hectares (LLDA 1995, accessed 2008).This, in turn, caused additional pollution to the lake, and further loss of catch from the lake waters.
In 1995, the following year, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order 240, an act “Creating the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Councils in Barangays, Cities, and Municipalities and their composition and functions”:
… in accordance with the policy of the Philippine Government to ensure that the active and extensive participation of people directly affected will be engaged in the management and control over fisheries and aquatic resources. The law also called for the empowerment of the subsistence fisherfolks through meaningful participation in the management, development and protection of fisheries and aquatic resources for sustainable productivity (http://www.adb.org , accessed March 2009).
According to a key informant, Darwin of PUMALAG, the E.O. 240 enacted by Pres. Ramos was used to the disadvantage of the fisher folks. The order prescribed the limitation of the extent to the fishing grounds that the local, smaller-scale fishermen are allowed to fish from.
The most recent problem the people are facing is the government’s plan of evicting these old residents from around the lake. According to the Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas (National Fisherfolks’ Movement of the Philippines) in a report of Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 2008), the LLDA and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were planning to evict more than 30,000 families of small fisherfolk and urban poor in Taytay, Cainta, and parts of Taguig and Pasig. Around 500,000 residents in Rizal, Laguna, and the National Capital Region or NCR will be displaced, paving the way for foreign-funded dike and road widening projects (PUMALAG, 2007).
The closing of the Napindan Channel created problems not only for fisherfolks, but more so for farmers who planted rice near the lake. With the implementation of Republic Act 4850 (R.A. 4850), which stipulated that the shoreland within the 12.5m elevation be within LLDA jurisdiction, the farmers have lost their right to claim the farmlands they have been cultivating. The farmers claimed that they were the ones who were paying the taxes for the lands and that the town would eventually be losing a great amount of rice production if the said R.A. would be implemented, which really happened soon thereafter.
Farmers living near the lake have cultivated rice nearly all their lives using the water in the lake as a source of irrigation. They have even developed an informal ownership arrangement among themselves. Some of them even held Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), for which the government was taxing them.
Although the Napindan structure was built in 1983, it was only in 1989 that the farmers felt its effects on their farms. Previously, these farmers thought that the flooding was only caused by the tidal conditions which they thought was a condition that they could do nothing much about. The situation continued to worsen and in the succeeding years, some farmers even felt “lucky” if they could have one rice cropping in a year. Many of the “unlucky” ones had to abandon their rice fields because the floodwater level would never subside.
According to an interview with Ka Mario, a 71-year old farmer from Pangil, at least 1,000 farm families in the fourth district of Laguna were affected by the Napindan Channel Structure. Almost 100 families were affected in his village of San Jose, Pangil alone. Prior to the Napindan channel’s establishment, the farmers could earn well, he added, with the help of the lake that was providing them enough water for irrigation. But when the channel became operational, the farm plots near the lake were gradually washed away, and the flooding still continues up to this date. In an interview with the members of the Samahan ng mga Magsasaka sa Ibaba, Pakil (SAMIP), a farmers’ organization in lower Pakil, they attested that Pakil had gradually lost around 1,000 hectares of farmlands planted to rice since the flooding started.
The peasants look at the project as a politically motivated one. They believe that the structure was constructed merely to protect the factories in Metro Manila. Even the planned eviction of the fisherfolk and urban poor around the lake was believed to be done to pave the way for foreign-funded infrastructure projects. These projects angered the peasants because according to the SAMIP, the government would prioritize the favorable condition of the capitalists who owned the factories and other industrial or commercial establishments in Manila and the income to be generated from them, over the welfare of the local fishing and farming community.
The CALABARZON (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, Quezon) project also exemplifies land conversion and privatization in the early 1990s (PUMALAG, 2007). The project, dubbed as Laguna Lake 2000, divided the lake into three uses: commercial, industrial, and ecotourism (Figure 3). This further decreased the income of the peasants (PUMALAG, 2007).
Figure 3. Comparative land use of Laguna de Bay (Source: Naghihingalong Lawa: Ang Kalagayan ng Lawa ng Laguna at mga Isyu, Ppt presentation prepared by PUMALAG, 2007)
The issue of the Napindan Channel may currently be the biggest problem for the farmers in the Fourth District of Laguna. However, not even one among the three Municipal Agriculture Officers (MAOs) that the researcher had visited talked about this issue. They were still grappling with the “minor” problems such as clashes among relatives and neighbors in the peasant community.
In the conversations with the MAOs, the researcher observed that the government officials viewed the problem from different lenses. First, as to LLDA’s claim to the lands, they said that the LLDA had legal claims to the areas inasmuch as they had the legal papers. The MAO from the third town said that the LLDA would consider only the lands which had titles dating before 1975 as validly titled. However, if these do not have titles, the LLDA will claim and manage the lands. Lands bought after 1975, although titled, were not honored by the LLDA.
Secondly, as to the farmers’ clamor for water and the opening of the channel, the MAO from the first town said that the farmers could actually crop only once a year because the level of water gets too high during the rainy season. Also, the flooding was not permanent and the farmers could plant when the water subsides. Furthermore, the MAO in the second town said that even if five villages (Banilan, Kabulusan, Casa Real, Matikew, Casinsin) are near the lake, they were allowed to farm in the upland area in exchange for their lands that were flooded. The farmers, he added, can even turn to fishing in the lake to make a living.
The MAO in the third town said the matter was too technical to explain. However, he commented that their rice fields (in the third town) is around 90 to 100 hectares. This is the only area that farmers can use during the dry season because during the wet season, the water level gets too high. “We can only use half of the fields, or even less, around one-third,” he said. He added that around the mid-1990s, the LLDA was no longer opening the channel – even during the dry season.
Communication Strategies Used
Barangay chairman Norman Patricio of San Jose in lower Pangil, a UPLB graduate who got involved in student activism during the late 1980s, related some of the communication strategies used by the farmers and PUMALAG to resist the closure of the Napindan Channel. In the series of discussions that the PUMALAG held, they always emphasized the importance of the following strategies:
Hold conferences and meetings in relation to the situation of the Laguna Lake and the negative effects that the government’s Laguna Lake 2000 program had generated.
Launch mass movements. Create mass organizations and encourage them to join the “Save Laguna Lake Movement” which will lead the campaign in coordination with the organizations of fishermen, farmers, poor communities, and other sectors who would be likewise affected by the government’s program.
Encourage and persuade a wider number of individuals, groups, and communities to support and join the campaign and mass actions.
Messages. When the PUMALAG came into the scene, it conducted investigations as to the situation of the farmers and the effects of the Napindan Channel to them. They were able to share the general knowledge the NGO have learned from these investigations. They held educational and group discussions among the peasants in the towns affected by the channel from 1989 up to this date, 2009.
It was not just the issue of the flooded rice fields that they discussed, but more so about the general condition of the Filipino farmers. During their initial contacts with the peasants, PUMALAG also gave short courses on Philippine society and on how to run an organization, and not just about the issues that they were facing. The farmers were also taught how to negotiate with high-ranking government officials, especially during table battles, as well as how to organize collective actions. PUMALAG also trained them in various farming technologies.
PUMALAG kept the peasants informed about the problem of the Napindan structure and the related issues surrounding the establishment of the NHCS. The messages were laid down clearly. They tried to clarify the ambiguities that the MAOs and the LLDA could not explain, especially facts that these institutions have not disclosed. They also revealed that the rice fields will likely continue to be flooded if the tourism project that the LLDA and the local government units have been planning will materialize.
According to barangay chairman Patricio, the peasant organization stressed the importance of the lake to the people’s livelihoods. They encouraged the farmers to fight for their welfare and for their rights to the farmlands (and to the use of the lake where they fished).
PUMALAG also pointed out that it is only through the unity of the peasants in the community that they could get back the lands that they have already lost. Since the flooding of their fields from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the farmers were able to pressure the LLDA to open the Napindan structure during the time when the peasants were still united and organized.
Channels. PUMALAG used various communication channels to help the organization spread the issues in the community. These channels facilitated better communication among the allied members of the organization, as well as between the peasants and government officials.
Mass media. Romy Malabanan, who became the chairperson of PUMALAG in 1998, was able to air the issues in his radio program over DZSP four times a week from 1998 to 1999. Tata Pido, chairperson of PAMALAKAYA (a fishermen’s group), was also able to discuss the Napindan issue on national television (Channels 4 and 13) in 1997, along with the condemnation of the bill passed in congress which was later called R.A. 8550, otherwise known as the Fisheries Code of 1998.
Other communication materials. ALMAPILA, one of the peasant groups requested to help organize the communities against the project used leaflets, educational discussion activities, radio, newspaper, and street performances to send out information, create awareness, and mobilize the citizens around the issue.
In 1991, ALMAPILA distributed flyers titled “Labanan ang Pagpapalit Gamit sa Pangisdaan” (Fight Against Lake Use Conversion) to the communities to raise people’s awareness regarding issues related to the Napindan structure and the proposed tourism project of LLDA and the local government units.
PUMALAG along with the peasant alliances also employed mobile propaganda teams (MPT) and Oplan Dikit (posters) to give more information to the local residents.
They also had Operation Balatenga and Operation Paanod wherein they posted streamers around Laguna Lake and placards on banana trunks and let them float to navigate through the lake. These were coordinated actions from 1997 until 1999.
Further, they staged Lakbay-Lawa wherein the peasants walked around the lake shoreline from San Pedro, to Pakil, Siniloan, Mabitac, and further on to Calamba. The event was led by the Propaganda Ahitasyon Organizing Team (PAOT). This team, created by PUMALAG, made placards, streamers, leaflets, and flyers for mass distribution. Regular Lakbay-Lawa activities ended in 2001, but there have been some instances when the groups of peasants held it again. The last time they held this activity was in October 2007.
Forming alliances. The farmers of Pangil also established ties with the Alyansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pangalawang Distrito ng Laguna (ALMAPILA or Alliance of Farmers in the Second District in Laguna). They asked ALMAPILA to help them organize a group to stop the project from being implemented.
In 1997, the established peasant organizations, together with ALMAPILA which later on became PUMALAG, first went to the town councilors to encourage them to present resolutions to the municipal council in support to the protest of the PUMALAG against the Napindan Channel. They “serenaded” the houses of the councilors to draw attention to the plight of the affected peasants. “They would let us come in and have some coffee,” Ka Darwin recalled.
They also invited these councilors to attend the fora and symposia they organized for that year (1997). “Some would agree to our position. Others gave their support by creating resolutions at the municipal level, but some just shrugged their shoulders,” Ka Darwin added.
Meetings. Aurelio, a peasant member of SAMIP, said that he was able to attend the meetings organized by the LLDA regarding the issue of flooding in the latter years of their campaign in 2000. However, these meetings did not yield any favorable response to their cause.
The LLDA also discussed a tourism project they were trying to put together in coordination with the local government units (LGUs). During the meeting, the planners revealed that they would provide speedboats that would ply the Pasig-Laguna route through the Laguna de Bay waters, providing an alternative water transport to relieve commuters from the congestion of the existing road traffic.
In 1998 and 1999, the MAOs in the affected towns also attended a few meetings organized by the various farmers’ groups to tackle the flooding issue. Unfortunately, the MAOs would always explain to the farmers that they have limited power as to the opening of the Napindan structure.
Pickets. The peasant groups also staged picket-dialogues to LLDA from 1997 up to this date, 2009. “They would tell us they would study the matter, but it just ended there. They did not respond to the resolution handed by the peasants,” Ka Darwin said. In May and October 2008, they held picket-dialogues again in front of the office of LLDA in Bay, Laguna.
Negotiations/Dialogues. The Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas sa Timog Katagalugan (PAMALAKAYA-ST or the National Fishermen’s Alliance in Southern Tagalog) and PUMALAG held various negotiations with the LLDA along with DENR and DPWH from 1996 to 1998.
According to LLDA, (1995, http://www.llda.gov.ph/masterplan, accessed November 2008):
Fishermen’s organizations along with fishpen operators demanded the opening of the hydraulic control structure which is being operated by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Whether LLDA has a significant hand in the construction or operation of these infrastructures (NHCS and MF), antagonism was mostly directed at LLDA, which they claimed was irrelevant and powerless to do anything about these issues which concerned the operation of NHCS-MF and their consequent negative impacts on the fishery sector. Negotiation between DPWH and the fishpen operators and fishermen leaders occurred many times to allow the opening of the structure, especially during summertime when saltwater is most needed by the fishery sector.
Meanwhile, no negotiations took place with the Municipal Agricultural Office as far as the issue of the Napindan Channel was concerned. This was probably because of the MAO’s limited power over the issue, real or perceived.
Approaches. The PUMALAG mainly used persuasion appeal to encourage the peasants to join the movement against the establishment of the NHCS. The organization stressed why they should fight for the farmlands that the LLDA was claiming to be under its authority to administer. Likewise, the negotiations/dialogues that occurred between the peasants and the government officials helped everyone to air the sentiments and be made aware of the needs of both sides.
Ka Fred from Pangil, on the other hand, recalled how he was personally persuaded to act on the issue. “Ka Alex (a fellow farmer) told me that if I would not act on the Napindan issue, my children would not be able to enjoy the benefits of the lake like I have/used to. I have four children, and I didn’t think that their would-be children could still enjoy farming and fishing (on the lake).” Since then around 1990, Ka Fred became one of the most active peasant leaders in the locality.
The peasants were likewise persuaded when PUMALAG made them realize that they also had the right to the land that the LLDA was claiming; and that through their collective voices and actions, they could generate a positive response from the government agencies responsible for the project.
The approaches that PUMALAG used seemed to work for they were able to get a great number of peasants from the communities of upper and lower Pangil, Paete, Pakil, and other towns in the Fourth District to join their cause. Much more than the personalities of the community organizers, the peasants joined in the protest actions because of the information and education shared to them by PUMALAG.
Some Outcomes of the Communication Strategies
Community mobilization. The worsening situation of the farmers caused by the flooding prompted them to consult with the ALMAPILA (which later became PUMALAG) organizers. They initiated contacts with the organizers in 1989 and have ever since been coordinating their activities and working well together until the year 1998.
Romy Malabanan, a local resident of the fourth district, was the most eager in leading the organizing activities. Alfredo Velasco (Ka Fred) from Barangay Banilan, upper Pangil was also one of the key leaders then.
“The organizing team of ALMAPILA scattered around the Fourth District. They talked with the affected farmers through group discussions, and they (the farmers) were willing to act on the issue,” Darwin narrated. Soon after, the ALMAPILA was able to create alliances with the peasants, as well as with some community leaders in the affected villages and towns.
PAMANA, an already established organization in the district chaired by Ka Maing, was transformed and led by the ALMAPILA in 1996 (but it eventually went back to its being a traditional organization in 1999).
The Samahan at Alyansa ng mga Mangingisda (SALAMIN or Alliance of Fishermens’ Groups) and Alyansa ng mga Magsasaka at, Manggagawa (ALMASEK or Alliance of farmers and workers) were both established in 1999, while Katipunan ng Masang Anak Pawis sa Pila (KAPS or Peasants’ Union of Pila) was created earlier in 1997. All these organizations were established as a result of the community organizing activities of the ALMAPILA to respond to the problems generated by the closure of the Napindan Channel.
The (current) PUMALAG also regularly conducted leadership training and seminars (LTS) when these organizations were established. During these years, the peasants, together with the PUMALAG community organizers, went to each town affected by the project. They talked to other peasants and encouraged them to participate in the discussions and mobilizations against the government project. They were able to conduct consultations and discussions with the key leaders from different affected barangays.
Partial compliance. Mr. Aurelio related that the farmers went to the LLDA office many times to negotiate with them not to close the channel. They said that the LLDA would accept their request, but they would close it again the next year.
Due to the widespread protest rallies from the municipal, provincial, to the national levels, the LLDA opened all six gates of the structure in 1998 but closed them again after two months, despite the increase in protests that occurred (based on the monitoring work of the peasant alliance group). Ka Darwin said, “They would only open one gate if they need to allow the flow of polluted water coming from the industrial enclaves, but not enough to allow the water from the rice fields to subside.”
The farmers continued protesting to the offices of LLDA and of the Department of Agriculture. They even marched to Mendiola (bridge near Malacanang Palace symbolic for being a popular venue for staging public protests), but the policy remained the same.
As of the moment, the hydraulic control structure remains closed. Although a few alliances of the PUMALAG have already lost hope of going back to their rice fields, some farmers are still willing to pursue their right to the lands they used to cultivate. They still believe that through more coordinated community organizing and persistent mobilizations, the LLDA and the other government agencies responsible for the flooding may yet yield to their demands.
Case Study 2: The Pangil River Dam Project
According to a December 2008 report of the Philippine Daily Inquirer officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System admitted “that the MWSS could not produce enough water for the metropolis” in the early years of the 1990s. To address this problem, former President Fidel V. Ramos enacted the Water Crisis Act of 1995 to supply Metro Manila’s need for potable water.
The same PDI report mentioned that as early as 1992, prior to the enactment, “the project preparation and development of the dam in the Pangil River had already begun.”
In the same year that the W.C.A.1995 was enacted and in response to the said act, the Sierra Madre Water Corporation (SMWC) proposed to construct a dam in Laguna and another one in Real, a town in the adjacent province of Quezon.
Laying out the components of the dam project, the SMWC would build catchments in the rivers where it would build a water reservoir. The reservoir would then pass the water through a pipeline which would start from the Pangil River either down to Parañaque or through Antipolo.
There are five rivers within the Sierra Madre mountain range, and one of them runs through the town of Pangil. Basically, the Pangil River water would power the mini-hydro power plant which the SMWC would also use to energize their total hydro-electric system. The electrical energy of the hydro power plant would be 69 kilovolts.
The proposed project would be done in three phases. The first phase would be the construction of two dams which would be used to impound water from the Pangil, Tibag, and Galalan Rivers. The second phase would entail the constuction of another two dams which would be approximately 70 meters wide and 30 meters high. These dams would generate water from Sala-salabang and Tataepo Rivers which are situated near the Pakil reservoir. The third phase would be the installation of a mini-hydro bulb-type power plant at the mouth of Pangil River to utilize the discharge of the tributaries of the lower catchments of the said river. The proposed water reservoir, or dam, in Pangil would be approximately 30 meters high which would contain 50 million cubic meters of water.
According to the summary report of SMWC, the project would comprise the following facilities and equipment:
Seven diversion weirs, tunnels, a pipeline and a pumping equipment that will generate a minimum of 8.2m3/sec of raw water to the treatment plant;
13,250 hectares of watershed;
708 water treatment plants at Mabitac Laguna;
Approximately 25km of collection/transfer tunnels; approximately 9km of delivery tunnels and approximately 48km of delivery pipelines.
Municipal and Village Officials’ Voices. According to the testimony of former Mayor Sergio Manzana, he had received a letter from the SMWC signed by their project coordinator Mr. Allan Bacalse, dated October 20, 1995. The letter contained a request for municipal clearance and endorsement for a new water supply project for Metro Manila. The letter proposed the following:
First, the water coming from the mountain will pass through the Pangil River to be used as potable water supply in Metro Manila.
Second, the project is in support of Pres. Fidel V. Ramos’s W.C.A. 1995. This would mean that the project will have its agency (SMWC) to continue the project because the act will expire on June 30, 1996.
The SMWC was asking permission to continue its feasibility study because of the timetable that they have already created. The period will be due in mid-January 1996.
On October 23, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council) of Pangil gave its approval, but only as far as the feasibility study was concerned, based on the following grounds:
“Whereas, in support to President Fidel V. Ramos’ Water Crisis Act of 1995, the Sierra Madre Water Corporation submitted its proposal;
Whereas, the proposal is in support of “potable water” supply for Metro Manila to be generated from the Pangil River;
Whereas, the said project will be built in the soils of Laguna and Quezon, that dams/mini-hydro power plant will be built; and
Whereas, to achieve the success of supplying “potable water” to Metro Manila, the Sierra Madre Water Corporation will have to make the “feasibility study” of its project;
Wherefore; in accordance with the proposal of Hon. Agapito P. Valera, Jr. and seconded by Hon. Eugene M. Reniva, and approved by all the members, the Municipal Council has decided to allow, AND IS NOW ALLOWING the Sierra Madre Water Corporation to accomplish its “feasibility study” of the proposed project.”
That same year, the former Mayor of Pangil agreed for the conduct of the feasibility study of the project despite the resolution from the Sanguniang Barangay (village council) to reject the said project, notwithstanding the disagreement of the barangay chairmen of the municipality of Pangil. However, later that year, seven out of the eight barangay chairmen of the town also approved the proposed project.
Project Planners' Voices. According to the SMWC, the planned project would be favorable for each barangay of Pangil and the other towns such as Paete and Pakil as well. The municipal governments in the district could generate income from it, according to the local government code regarding projects of private companies. Each barangay would have been entitled to receive 10 million pesos whereas the municipality would receive at least 30 million pesos, annually.
According to the planners, they would only use the water from Pangil to supply their mini-hydro power plant. They explained that most of the water that they would use to supply Manila would be generated from the rivers flowing to the Pacific Ocean and not so much from the Pangil River.
Peasants’ Voices. However, Hon. Peping Gana, the Barangay Chairman of Balian in Pangil (and the sole barangay leader who was left opposing the dam project) and his first councillor Hon. Santi Adrada, along with the other concerned citizens of Pangil foresaw the possible water shortage in the whole town. The water shortage might cause drought to the agricultural barangays, such as Banilan where irrigation is badly needed.
The townspeople also feared that the dam might not be strong enough to hold the water. According to the plan, the intended size of the dam was about 400m above sea level from Laguna de Bay. If the dam would break, the towns of Pakil, Siniloan, Famy, and Mabitac would surely be affected, especially Mabitac which is situated on very low ground. The 50,000 cubic feet of water in the dam cannot be contained in the tunnel, hence, it would surely overflow into the nearby towns mentioned.
The issues were unknown to most of the residents of the said towns. The municipal leaders, as well as the other barangay officials, did not disclose these to their constituents. Chairman Peping, the sole official who opposed the project, expressed disgust over what he called “playing politics” by his fellow officials:
“We had two members of the municipal council in our barangay who had never even fought for us. They just agreed with the project because they were overpowered by the mayor. The mayor’s family financed the candidacy of the councilors; their political parties would be supported. Majority of the budget would come from the SMWC, the project holder.”
Chairman Peping said that the mayor used his power to persuade those chairmen to accept the project. He cited three reasons why he thought these leaders approved the project:
“First, they would get money from it. There have already been two elections when they [the investors] have supported their candidacies and allies just so they would stay in power. This is because the project cannot be implemented if the winning candidate is not an ally of the Sierra Madre Water Corporation. Second, they wanted to hunt for treasures allegedly left by the Japanese. Third, the Manzanas are connected with the Fil-estate, so in their feasibility study, the mayor would get 20%.”
Fil-estate is a business corporation in charge mainly of development projects. According to Chairman Peping, Fil-estate would be the one responsible for the technical job, as contracted by the SMWC.
Communication Strategies Used
To protect the interest of the peasant community, a group of concerned citizens – an opposition group – was created. Led by Ka Peping and Ka Santi, then Barangay Balian chairman and first councilor, respectively, the Mamamayang Nagmamalasakit sa Kalikasan at Kaligtasan ng Buhay (MNKKB or Concerned Citizens for Life and the Environment) was later formed. The former chairman had served his constituents as barangay chairman for three consecutive terms (one term of office is three years). Although he was never personally involved in any mass movements prior to the dam issue, his political orientation had always been one where social justice for his constituents would prevail.
From 1995 when the proposed project was approved, the MNKKB undertook various community organizing activities to persuade the people to fight against the SMWC dam project. Later, the movement was joined by the citizens of Pangil, especially from Barangay Balian, militant groups like Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights) and PUMALAG, students, priests, and other concerned sectors.
The members of MNKKB conducted information drives in all the barangays.
Messages. Information campaigns regarding the municipal officials’ approval for the feasibility study to proceed which could then be used to establish the dam, with its possible negative effects, was conducted in all the barangays of Pangil.
The MNKKB members distributed the copies of their petition paper (A Strong Protest Against the Sierra Madre Mountain Water Supply Project to Build the Dams/ Reservoir) to disseminate information to the community around the first quarter of 2005. The paper stated:
“The four dams…which would submerge 13,250 hectares of land or watershed, will generate 8.2 cubic meters per second of raw water, egress 500-600 million litres of water everyday, are detrimental to us who are living near the foot of the Sierra Madre Mountain and the lower parts of the shore land in Laguna de Bay.
There could be an appalling event that could happen today or to the coming generation – death and loss of property of the residents, our loved ones, me and you.
This is not about money, our lives are at stake. Save Sierra Madre Mountain, No to Dams!”
The MNKKB flyer also encouraged the people to “learn from experience. Protest against the dam project and any project that would destroy the Sierra Madre Mountain.”
The group believed that the current Municipal Mayor Juanita Manzana was determined to support the project. She sent a letter to Bishop Leo M. Drona of the Diocese of San Pablo dated March 22, 2005, explaining about the SMWC project.
The municipal mayor informed the residents that the MNKKB has erred in its projections against the dam project, and that the organization was only exaggerating the issues. The letter contained the following messages:
There is no assurance or approval that the project would push through.
There is no truth to the claim that 13,250 hectares of land would be submerged in Pangil because the town has only about 6,947 hectares.
The depth of the dam would only be 30 meters. This would be put in the “315-meter embankment elevation” which means that the dam would be built in the mountain 315 meters from the sea.
In the feasibility study of SMWC, the company’s supposedly priority activity would be the planting and protecting of trees in the mountain to create a watershed. In the meeting with the SMWC, the municipality emphasized that the corporation could not generate any water from the Pangil river that goes directly to Laguna Lake because the town needed it. They could only get water from rivers in another part of the mountain – those which directly go to Lamon Bay and the Pacific Ocean.
The church, which opposed the project, called upon the residents of Pangil to act on this matter. Bishop Leo M. Drona gave his own message dated October 20, 2005:
“The mountain of Pangil is created and given by the Lord for the residents of Pangil and for all those who are giving importance to the land.
It is our obligation to maintain the peace and order for the benefit of everyone.
I am giving my support to any activities that would be carried out so that the grace we receive from the Lord would be preserved for the people and for the next generation of Pangil.”
In a news report of the Barangay newspaper (February 16-12, 2005), Bishop Drona also warned his constituents to “take serious considerations in studying the long term consequences of constructing a dam, together with the help of geology experts and environmental specialists… multinationals and transnational corporations who would be tapped to undertake the project are never conscious about preserving our forest and environment.”
The prelates of Infanta of Infanta, Quezon also sent their support to the movement. Titled “Pahayag ng Paninindigan ng Kaparian ng Prelatura ng Infanta” (Position Paper of the Prelates of Infanta, n.d.), they distributed the copies of their campaign to the community containing the following statement:
“We, the prelates in Infanta, have experienced the calamity brought upon by the uncontrollable typhoons which hit the mountain ranges of Sierra Madre. This killed more than 1,000 residents, sent hundreds of indigenous people away from their homeland, destroyed more than 5,000 houses, farm lots, property, and affected more than 10,000 families.
The Catholic Bishops of the Philippines and various groups have long been campaigning against the relentless logging in Sierra Madre for the past years. The government, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and other local officials have been deaf and blind regarding this issue.”
The priests then addressed these messages to the MNKKB. It was expected that the alliance would:
“Further work on raising the awareness of all the people in the community on how to protect the environment;
Bring the illegal loggers and the accomplice government officials, be it from local to national levels, to court; and
Look for alternative sources of livelihood (for the local people) which would not be detrimental to the environment.”
More people believed in the MNKKB’s messages that the project would surely have a negative effect on the various towns in the province, and especially so on the farmers.
Channels. The alliance immediately communicated with cause-oriented groups willing to help and with the Catholic Church which was committed to take a concerted action with them. The MNKKB had to personally negotiate the matter with the municipal mayor, while at the same time communicating with the residents of the various towns to stop the project. The group also went directly to the farmers in the communities. The priests on the other hand encouraged other church leaders to talk about the dam project during their ceremonies.
Information-education communication (IEC) campaign. In 2005, the MNKKB sent out petition papers, flyers, leaflets, letters of appeal, and other campaign materials which all described the effects that the project might create. They mobilized the members to carry out an information campaign about the plan in every barangay
The flyers entitled “Save Sierra Madre- Save the People (No to Dam, no to Logging, no to Mining)” were widely circulated during the campaign. It contained the statement of the alliance of the farmers, fisherfolks, local barangay officials, residents of Pangil, and the church against the establishment of dam.
Newspapers. According to an article in the Business newspaper (August 1, 2003) the MWSS had the bidding plan for a big water project in Metro Manila. Included among the seven interested parties was the SMWC. The article further explained the interest of the SMWC to push through with the dam project.
The Barangay weekly newspaper (Feb 6-12, 2005) also reported that the Catholic Church under Bishop Leo M. Drona announced the plan to spearhead a movement throughout the diocese of San Pablo to save the Sierra Madre Mountain ranges.
According to the news, Bishop Drona “told parish leaders, parishioners including officials of the municipal government that the issue on environment is extremely crucial.”
Protest rallies. Also in 2005, the diocese of San Pablo helped lead protest rallies. The church helped the MNKKB to inform, educate, persuade, and motivate the local residents to resist the project.
Forum/meetings, motions/petitions, court hearings. The Forum on Environment was held in April 18, 2005 at the Central Elementary School of Pangil. The meeting was attended by the residents from the towns of the Fourth District, and the former and current mayors of Pangil –Sergio Manzana and Juanita Manzana, respectively. Questions about the events and current status of the Sierra Madre Water Project were raised, but no clear answers were given.
A hearing was then held the following day, April 19, with the National Water Resources Board. The leaders and members of MNKKB attended, along with other concerned citizens; it was only then that they learned the truth that water permits were already given to the project.
The groups filed a motion and petition to stop the implementation of the project to the National Water Resources Board. Along with the petition paper was a signature drive to show the municipal government how many were opposing the project.
Further, the allied groups sent letters to the Mayors’ League in Laguna and Rizal in the early quarter of 2005 requesting them to support the mass actions that the various action groups have been undertaking. None of the mayors in Laguna heeded their call.
Some Outcomes of the Communication Strategies
Community organization and alliance building. As mentioned earlier, the first action of the peasants was to organize themselves to create an alliance. They built coalitions with the citizens of Pangil (especially from Barangay Balian), militant groups like the Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights (KARAPATAN), PUMALAG, students, the Catholic church, and other concerned sectors. The alliance was later on called as the Mamamayang Nagmamalasakit sa Kalikasan at Kaligtasan ng Buhay or MNKKB.
The allied group had been able to file with the NWRB a motion to stop the implementation of the dam project. “Petition for Annulment by the National Water Resources Board of Water Permits Given to Pangil, Paete (Laguna) and Real (Quezon) Related to the Sierra Madre Water Project” was docketed as Case No. 15024 (Pangil), with SMWC as sole respondent.
Furthermore, although the town and city mayors ignored their request to nullify the approved petition of the SMWC for a feasibility study, as sent by the MNKKB in the early quarter of 2005, this request did put pressure on the Laguna provincial government to consider and to discuss their petition in the provincial administrative board.
The MNKKB earlier on forged an alliance with the church because they knew that it would cooperate in favor of the welfare of the masses. Led by Bishop Leo M. Drona of the diocese of San Pablo, the Church joined in the mass actions; the Church actually led the protest rallies thereafter. The church helped the MNKKB to inform and educate the people about the issues surrounding the dam project, and persuade and motivate them to join the mass actions to protest against its implementation.
Equally important, the Bishop also encouraged the other church leaders to talk about the dam project during their ceremonies.
The MNKKB was able to mobilize a substantial number of people for their first day of protest actions. The alliance also had a motorcade with Bishop Drona who actually led the protest speeches. Even those who were not going to be directly affected by the project participated in the protest activities that followed. These included residents of the neighboring town of Pagsanjan and other members of multi-sectoral groups. However, most of those who attended were from the peasant sector.
These created heightened awareness, which further encouraged more people from Pangil and nearby towns to participate in the protest actions. The once politically passive local residents were “awakened” and became united on this particular issue.
MNKKB focused its information drive more on the effects of the project to farming, because the town is an agricultural community. The thought of such potential damage was a big motivating factor that compelled many residents to give their support to the MNKKB.
More facts about the plan to build the dam were disclosed from 1996 to 2005 when the project was stopped, During all those years of community organizing, the issue of corruption and the role of the municipal government in paving the way for water projects such as the dam were made public. It should be remembered that the Water Crisis Act was enacted in 1995 yet, but as mentioned in the PDI article, project preparations for a dam in Pangil River have reportedly been underway as early as 1992.
After almost a decade since the people stated creating noise against the construction of the dam, people are apprehensive that the project will be resurrected.
The last time that the Municipality of Pangil held a public hearing was in September 19, 2003, in which no ruling was granted to annul the petition of the SMWC for a feasibility study. No second hearing was called because the SMWC already lost coordination with the municipality. Ka Santi disclosed that the developer, along with the municipal government, would find means to push through with their plan. “They have already spent millions for the project, they cannot just give up their initial spending,” he added.
Broken Chain of Silence: An Analysis
Social projects are designed to ease up or mitigate the adversities of the people in a community. However, together with their avowed benefits, also inherent to any such projects are the inevitable negative effects to a group or sector in a community where the projects have been implemented.
The Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure (NHCS) was designed to help solve the flooding problem in parts of Metro Manila. However, in the process of addressing the said problem, great damage has been inflicted on the fisher folks and farmers in the Fourth District of Laguna. The fishermen in Laguna Lake have experienced dwindling fish catch, while most farmers whose rice fields are near the lake had to abandon their farms when the flooding around the lake worsened. In protecting the economic center of the country, a few sectors in Laguna had to bear the consequences. Mainly because of these consequences, the peasants had to voice out their sentiments against the NHCS and to the other government agencies that had a hand in the operation of the structure.
The same issue goes to the Sierra Madre Water Corporation Dam Project. Metro Manila desperately needed tap water supply, which the provinces of Laguna and Quezon could provide. In responding to this need, the residents of Pangil could have been suffering by now from lack of water supply to their own municipality. Rice production could decline.
Communication played the most essential part in addressing these two conflicts that have confronted the peasants in the Fourth District of Laguna. Through the various messages, channels, and approaches that the PUMALAG and the MNKKB have used, the peasants were able to respond against the establishment of the Napindan Hydraulic Control Structure and the planned dam project of the Sierra Madre Water Corporation.
A top-down approach was used by both NGOs to encourage the people to participate in their protest undertakings. Whereas participatory communication involves a two-way dialogue process with the full involvement of individuals/stakeholders in resolving conflicts, the PUMALAG and MNKKB informed, educated, and persuaded the residents of the Fourth District for mass actions.
The community organizing activities undertaken as a response against these two projects raised the awareness of the peasants in the Fourth District of Laguna, especially the sectors or groups which were directly (or were going to be) affected by the structures.
Although the farmers were only able to get partial compliance from the LLDA with regard to the NHCS and the communities in Pangil remain wary that the SMWC would still pursue the dam project, the peasants in both cases have learned valuable lessons from the community organizers and from the actions that they themselves have undertaken.
For example, PUMALAG and MNKKB were able to change the attitudes of the peasants – transforming them from being passive members of society to being active participants in the social issues that confront their sector. Previously, they rarely involved themselves in political issues, and less so, in joining any political organizations or actions. They would simply rely on government projects; they would join farmers’ organizations only to gain access to irrigation and other benefits from the Offices of the Municipal Agriculture.
The community organizers were able to persuade these peasants to join advocacy gatherings, especially in joining protest rallies and other forms of social mobilizations which they have never done so in the past. The peasants’ social awareness was heightened during the time of community organizing, as far as issues affecting them were concerned.
The peasants have learned the benefits of solidarity. They forged stronger social ties among themselves and learned that one person, or one organization, cannot stand alone; and that their collective forces can help them win battles, even against established institutions and people in the mainstream politics. Community solidarity has demonstrated to them that they can rely on another because of the power of collective support for shared issues.
The peasants were able to grasp the essence of shared sense of responsibility. They have learned that development can be achieved through the members’ acceptance of their responsibilities. They have also learned that individuals were answerable to the whole organization, which in turn relied on how each member acted toward the same goal.
In the end, with all these new awareness and strengths that the peasants have shown – in the local communities as well as in the national scene – the government officials have also been awakened by the fact that the peasants could create such a strong voice to fight against any projects that could negatively affect their lives. It was an awakening that whenever they (officials) would create a project, they could never ignore the voices and power of the people in the community whose lives would be affected.
Such were the words of Ka Aurelio from SAMIP when he said:
“The LLDA project had done us extreme damage; it greatly lessened the amount of food produced in Laguna. There is a big problem in farming (and fishing). The government slowly subjugates the peasants because when we fight against the government, there would be a revolution.”
